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Legal duties as part of the governance
framework for incorporated associations: A
comparative analysis
Kim D Weinert*
Incorporated associations are founded by, and subsequently operate
exclusively on, the collective action of individuals, which is largely voluntary
and motivated by altruistic goals. This article will examine through doctrinal
analysis the statutory duties and common law obligations of an incorporated
association. In examining these specific legal duties, this article will reveal
the lack of consistency across Australian jurisdictions, and gaps in how the
law regulates the conduct of committee members within an incorporated
association. Furthermore, this article will consider whether an officer of an
incorporated and unincorporated association is a fiduciary — and, if this is
so, whether this status arises out of the category of principal and agent.
Introduction
All forms of not-for-profit organisations are not immune from collapse due to
mismanagement.1 In spite of an altruistic mission at its core, when a
not-for-profit organisation does collapse, questions are inevitably raised
regarding the degree of regulation these organisations can rely on in their
management structure. In the push for improved regulation and greater
governance for not-for-profit organisations, there is the misconception that
officers of a management committee of an incorporated association find
themselves in the same position as company directors.2 While this is true of
officers of a company limited by guarantee it is not true otherwise.
Reliance on, and attraction to, this misconception is largely due to the slim
body of case law and legislation for incorporated associations, which
inadequately clarifies legal duties for its management committee.3 This article
* B Comm (Griffith), JD (Bond), Grad Dip Legal Prac (Bond), LLM (Research) Bond. Kim
is a legal practitioner admitted in the Supreme Court, Queensland, Australia, a sessional
teaching fellow and Senior Research Assistant within the Faculty of Law, Bond
University.The author would like to thank Emeritus Professor John Farrar for his
encouragement, feedback, thoughts and comments on this paper.
1 For example, Zoe’s Place was placed into voluntary administration and was placed under
investigation by the Health Quality and Complaints Commission for serious allegations
relating to complaints of malpractice. S Elsworth, ‘Zoe’s Place in Queensland may Close’,
The Australian (online), 18 June 2009, at <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/zoes-
place-in-queensland-may-close/story-0-1225737048892> (accessed 19 June 2009). See also
K Weinert, ‘Is there a Perfect Environment to Allow a Villain and a Villainess to Thrive?’
in R Franks and S Meindl (Eds), The Real and the Reflected: Heroes and Villains in Existent
and Imagined Worlds, Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2012, p 49.
2 K Fletcher, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and New Zealand, Law
Book Company, 1986, p 289; A Twaits, ‘The Duties of Officers and Employees in Non-Profit
Organisations’ (1998) 10(2) Bond Law Review 313.
3 There are two obvious reasons why there is a lack of judicial authority for incorporated
associations. First, in the event a member of a Queensland incorporated association has a
grievance regarding the misgivings of the management committee, all complaints must be
38
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briefly examines the functions of a management committee as compared to a
board of directors, and asserts that a need exists to regulate a committee
member’s conduct through legal duties.
Furthermore, this article compares each of the statutory legal duties of both
a corporation and an incorporated association, illustrating the differences in
the legal duties of a committee member as compared to a company director
and how the law considers them differently.4 Precision can be seen to be
lacking in both the common law and the statute law’s approach to prescribing
legal duties for a committee member. Consequently, to fill this gap, attention
is turned to equity and the question of whether or not fiduciary principles can
provide clarity.
Australia’s development of fiduciary law in this area has stagnated with the
courts expressing a reluctance to expand the established categories of
fiduciary relationships and, also, to find for a breach of these duties within
these established fiduciary categories. The application of this law to
unincorporated and incorporated associations is largely unknown and
previously unexamined. This article considers whether committee members of
an unincorporated and an incorporated association are, in fact, fiduciaries
through the established relationship of principal and agent and, therefore,
subject to fiduciary duties.
The respective functions of a board of directors and
a management committee
Similarities between the roles of a director and an officer of a management
committee can be evidenced in that each operate as a collective group of
individuals elected or appointed to their respective positions. The incorporated
association legislation provides that the function of the management
settled by the Supreme Court: Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 71(2). Supreme
Court actions would be out of reach for an ordinary member (particularly for members of a
level 1 and level 2 associations) due to high litigation costs and the risks in pursuing
litigation, and the highly legalistic nature of making an application in this jurisdiction.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has the discretionary power to dismiss applications if the
court believes the matter is trivial: Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 73(2)(a); see
Re Maggacis [1994] 1 Qd R 59; BC9303047. Furthermore, Queensland’s governing
executive department (Office of Fair Trading) has no statutory authority to receive,
investigate, or settle any complaints or disputes relating to the management of an
incorporated association. The only powers the executive has over incorporated association
relates to the administration of an incorporated association: Associations Incorporation Act
1981 (Qld) Pt 6 Div 2; Associations Incorporation Regulations 1999 (Qld) reg 14 and Pt 5
Div 3.
4 The Australian Charities and Not-for-Profit Commission (Consequential and Transitional)
Act 2012 (Cth) turns off the statutory duties of care and diligence, good faith and not to
misuse position or information under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for directors of a
company limited by guarantee. Therefore, it is prudent to note that this article is concerned
with the legal duties of a director within a for-profit entity. At the time of publication the
Australian Charities and Not-for-Profit Commission (Consequential and Transitional) Act
2012 remain in effect, despite the federal government announcing the abolition of the
Australian Charities and Not-for-Profit Commission. See Australian Charities and
Not-for-Profit Commission, Latest News, Update: Status of ACNC Act, 14 March 2014
<https://www.acnc.gov.au/ACNC/Comms/LN/Update_Status_of_ACNC_Act.aspx>
(accessed on 23 March 2014).
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committee is to control and manage the association’s operation and business;
collectively, the committee has control of the association’s property.5
However, little is really known about how a management committee carries
out these legislative functions. With no direct prescription (either by
convention or legislation) on how to achieve these functions and manage an
association, a management committee has the freedom and the autonomy on
how best to manage its association. There is, of course, an expectation that a
management committee will guide the management of the association in
accordance with the association’s altruistic mission – that is, with integrity,
and in a manner free from self-interest and, moreover, impropriety
The pursuit of profit maximisation for companies provides a more definitive
set of functions of a board of directors, being:
• appointing and rewarding a chief executive officer;
• setting business goals;
• formulating strategies;
• approving business plans (which includes setting annual budgets,
make key management decisions such as, major capital expenditure,
restructuring and refinancing and business acquisitions);
• monitoring the performance and results of the business and
management;
• establishing and review shareholders policies (where relevant); and
• examining conformance strategies.6
These tasks, both specific and numerous, clearly dictate that a board of
director’s function is to achieve and maintain a company’s fiscal capabilities.
Accordingly, the economic nature of a company’s activities is justification for
regulation, and for a company director to be accountable. However, the
traditional view is that incorporated associations pursue non-economic
activities, and that the trustworthiness of an incorporated association means
the need for regulation is not warranted. Without regulation, or a clear set of
obligations compelling an officer to undertake the proper administration of a
not-for-profit organisation, dishonest committee members are free to use the
incorporated association’s property and resources for private interests and
gain.7
Regulation and accountability of committee members
There are overwhelming social and economic reasons to justify the regulation
of not-for-profit organisations. While theoretically both an incorporated
association and a company are accountable to their members, a company
achieves this better than an incorporated association. Corporation law
5 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 60; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas)
s 21 and Model Rule 23; Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 21; Associations
Regulations 2004 (Model Constitution) (NT) Pt 4; Associations Incorporation Act 1981
(Vic) Sch 1 r 4 (Vic); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 29; Associations
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 20; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 60.
Furthermore, an association’s property also includes the association’s funds as well as real
property.
6 H Ford, R Austin and I Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, 15th ed,
Butterworths, 2013, pp 225–6.
7 Weinert, above n 1.
40 (2014) 29 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
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promotes a culture of transparency and accountability through the concept of
governance. Basic governance within a corporation provides a framework to
protect an organisation’s resources, and to effectively manage and control
risk.8 The governance framework for a company is set by the law and
reinforced by regulatory bodies.9 The requirements compel a company to
maintain robust internal processes and have systems in place, such as accurate
financial reporting, and timely disclosure of material interests.10 At the centre
of the governance framework is the board of directors and, specially, attention
is on the director’s behaviour in governing the organisation. In undertaking
their roles, directors must follow specific legal duties and obligations, which
is an important mechanism of organisational governance.11 Conversely, the
law relating to incorporated associations does very little to encourage a
management committee to achieve transparency, accountability, governance,
or to protect an association’s property.
The regulatory framework
Statutory duties
For management committees of an incorporated organisation the duties are set
out in the state legislation. Directors of a company limited by guarantee are
subject to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
provides statutory duties extending to: each director; company secretary; any
other person who makes or participates in decision-making that affects the
whole or a substantial part of the company; and anyone else who has the
capacity to significantly affect the company’s financial standing.12 The
incorporated associations’ legislation does not have a similar statutory
provision; however, any statutory duties prescribed under the association
legislation are read to apply only to members of a management committee.13
There are numerous inconsistences between the statutory duties of a company
director and an officer of a management committee, and each duty will be
individually examined.
Duty of care and diligence
Section 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that directors
must discharge their duties and use their powers with a degree of care and
8 A Cadbury, Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View, Oxford University
Press, 2002, p 220.
9 A Calder, Corporate Governance: A Practical Guide to the Legal Frameworks and
International Codes of Practice, Kogan Page, 2008, p 1.
10 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
11 I Ramsay, Corporate Governance and the Duties of Company Directors, Centre for
Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne, 1997,
p 10.
12 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(1). Section 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) defines
the term ‘director’ to also include de facto and shadow directors.
13 See Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) Pt 4 Div 1; Associations Incorporation Act
1995 (SA) Pt 4 Div 1; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) Pt v; Associations
Incorporation Act 1997 (WA) Pt v; Associations Act 2003 (NT) Pt 4 Div 1; Associations
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) Pt 4.
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diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if they were in the position
and in those same circumstances. A similar, clearly expressed provision in the
legislation for incorporated associations can be found in Victoria and South
Australia, where this provision states that an officer of a management
committee must act at all times with reasonable care and diligence when
exercising their powers and in discharging their duties of their office.14 The
wording of this provision is similar to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth);
however s 39A(4) of the South Australian Act and the new Victorian
legislation does not go as far as s 180(1) because they omit the key phrases:
‘in a like position’; and ‘in the corporation’s circumstances’. This exclusion of
these means that these provisions do not import any standard of care and
diligence (whether objective or subjective) on an officer of a management
committee. The cases tend not to distinguish clearly between duties of care,
diligence and skill. The duty of diligence first appeared in the case of the
Charitable Corporation v Sutton15 and aspects of this case have been referred
to in modern cases. Although it can be argued that the duty of diligence is a
sub-set of care, due to the loose usage in the cases it is worth considering it
separately.
The duty of skill
The elements of skill and a standard of skill are not specified in either s 39A(4)
of Associations Incorporation Act 1995 (SA) or s 180(1) of the Corporations
Act 2001 (Cth). However, over time, the courts have inferred that directors are
subject to an objective standard that obliges directors to:
• reasonably understand the company’s affairs insofar that a director is
capable of reaching an informed opinion of the company’s financial
position;16
• be capable to keep abreast of the company’s affairs;17 and
• to keep sufficient abreast of the company’s affairs to act appropriately
in the event the company is unable to pay its debts in due course, and
the director is to reasonably expect the company cannot pay its
debt.18
The payment of debts is addressed by three states in their respective
association’s legislation: New South Wales, Northern Territory, and South
Australia. These provisions refer to a member of the management committee,
or a person who took part in the management of the association, who at the
time of, or immediately before, incurring a debt had reasonable grounds to
accept that the association would be capable of paying the incurred debt when
14 Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 39A; Associations Incorporation Reform Act
2012 (Vic) s 84; Associations Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) Sch 4, Model
Rule 45(3)
15 (1742) 2 Atk 400, citing Coggs v Bernard 1 Salk 26; 91 ER 25.
16 Statewide Tobacco Services v Morley (1990) 2 ACSR 405; 8 ACLC 827.
17 Re Australasian Venzolana Pty Ltd (1962) 4 FLR 60.
18 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich (1991) 5 ACSR 115; 9 ACLC 946;
BC9100656.
42 (2014) 29 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
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it became due.19 Furthermore, the states’ legislation provides a statutory
defence if an officer can prove the debt was incurred outside of their consent
and authority.20 Additionally, officers will not be liable if, at the time the debt
was incurred, they had reasonable cause to accept that the association could
not pay all its debts when they became due.21 These provisions imply that a
committee member must have knowledge and a basic understanding of the
association’s finances. Company directors are required to possess a level of
skill to be able to understand the company’s affairs and its financial
statements.22
Duty of solvency
Under the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), a company director
has a duty to prevent insolvent trading.23 New South Wales and the Northern
Territory also place a positive duty to prevent insolvency upon committee
members, similar to that of company directors. Furthermore, the legislation of
these states has defence and penalty provisions that reflect ss 588H (defence)
and 588J (penalty and recovery of the debt) of the Corporations Act 2001
(Cth). While these respective provisions for the prevention of insolvency
employ different terms, there is a defence available for a director and a
committee member if both are able to prove that they had reasonable grounds,
or a reasonable presumption, to expect the association or company could meet
its debts at a time, or shortly after, the debt was incurred.24 Looking
specifically at the key term ‘reasonable grounds to expect’, which is contained
in both pieces of legislation, it implies that there was a possibility that the debt
could be paid.25 Therefore, there must have reasonable grounds of being
confident that the company is solvent.26 Further, committee members in New
South Wales and the Northern Territory could successfully argue that an
officer of a management committee had reasonable grounds to expect the
association was solvent.
Duty of diligence
For a company director, ‘their duty of care is their obligation to exercise
reasonable prudence’.27 A director in exercising this duty must not be seen to
be passive in attending board meetings.28 The common law expects company
19 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 68; Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 90;
Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 9AD.
20 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 68(3); Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 90(2);
Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 49AD(2).
21 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 68(3); Associations Act 2003 (NT) 90(2);
Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 49AD(2).
22 Ford, Austin and Ramsay, above n 6, p 501.
23 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588G.
24 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588H(2); Associations Incorporation 2009 (NSW) s 68(3);
Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 90(2).
25 Tourprint International Pty Ltd (in liq) v Bott (1999) 17 ACLC 1543; 32 ACSR 201; [1999]
NSWSC 581; BC9903133.
26 Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty Ltd v Miller (1997) 23 ACSR 699; BC9702035
27 Re Property Force Consultants Pty Ltd [1997] 1 Qd R 300; (1995) 13 ACLC 1051 at 1061;
BC9505859.
28 Vrisakis v ASIC (1993) 9 WAR 395; 11 ACSR 162; 11 ACLC 763.
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directors to attend all meetings unless there are exceptional circumstances that
prevent them from attending.29 However, for a committee member of an
incorporated association, the requirement to attend meetings is less stringent
than that of a corporation, and is largely subject to association’s Model Rules.
Queensland’s Model Rules set out the required number of members, and who
from the management committee must be present, to conduct meetings30 —
but these Rules places no specific obligation on individual members as to their
rate of attendance. Conversely, the chair of meetings must be the association’s
president of the association, which gives the implication that there is a higher
requirement on the president to attend meetings more than other committee
members.31 Furthermore, McPherson J in Ward v Eltherington held that an
officer could not avoid liability by being absent from all committee
meetings.32
Additionally, a director’s inattention at board meetings is a cause for
concern.33 The concept of attendance, as it applies to a company director, has
been stated as taking the reasonable steps to guide and monitor the company
with attention to:34
1. acquire a rudimentary understanding of the company’s business;
2. be informed about the company’s activities;
3. generally monitor the company’s affairs and policies; and
4. be familiar with the financial status of the company by undertaking
regular review of the company’s financial statements.35
For incorporated associations, there are no guiding principles or statutory
provisions applicable to committee members on the obligation of being
attentive at meetings. As the statutory power and responsibility is given to
committee members to manage an association, there is a reasonable
expectation that a committee member would be conscientious of the
association’s activities, policies, affairs and its financial standing.
29 Ibid.
30 Associations Incorporation Regulation 1999 (Qld) Pt 3 Div 1, Model Rule 23(5).
Queensland’s Model Rules require that for a management committee to be held, more than
50% of elected members to the committee must be present: Associations Incorporation
Regulation 1999 (Qld) Pt 3 Div 1, Model Rule 24.
31 Associations Incorporation Regulation 1964 (Tas) Model Rule 15; Associations
Incorporation Regulation 1984 (NSW) Model Rule 8; Associations (Model Constitution)
Regulations 2005 (NT) Model Rule 35; Associations Incorporation Regulations 1998 (Vic)
Model Rule 14; Associations Incorporation Regulation 1999 (Qld) reg 23(9) and Model
Rule 14. Associations can determine their own committee meeting procedure and the
numbers for a quorum. These provisions also provide for the incorporated association to
have alternatives for a chair should the president be unable to attend. Associations
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 23A(1)(c)(v); Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA)
s 16, Sch 1; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) Sch 1.
32 [1982] Qd R 561.
33 Ashurst v Mason (1875) LR 20 Eq 225.
34 Daniels t/as Deloitte Haskins Sells v AWA Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; (1995) 118 FLR 248;
(1995) 16 ACSR 607; BC9504558.
35 Francis v United Jersey Bank (1981) 43 2A 2d 414; Daniel t/as Deloitte Haskins Sells v
AWA Ltd (1995) 16 ACSR 607.
44 (2014) 29 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
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Reliance and delegation
Both a company director and a committee member could find themselves in
circumstances where they need to rely on advice (expert or otherwise) and
delegate roles to others within the corporation or association. The
management committee has the legislative ability to delegate any or all of
their functions and powers to a subcommittee of the association.36 A
company’s board of directors also have the statutory authority to delegate their
powers.37 Excluding the Northern Territory, the delegation power for an
incorporated association is largely confined to sub-committees, whereas
directors can delegate their own powers to other directors, employees, or to
any other persons.
The associations’ legislation does not specify whether a management
committee is ultimately responsible for the actions of the delegate, whereas
the Commonwealth statute provides that a director who delegated power is
responsible for the delegate.38 It is unclear whether such a responsibility falls
onto the management committee and/or the individual. The issue of whether
or not the rules of agency are applicable in this instance will be discussed
further in this article.
Boards of directors have the power to rely on and seek advice from certain
people.39 Information and professional advice is often sought and relied on by
directors, and they would have reasonable grounds for having confidence in
the following people:
• An employee of the corporation — grounds for confidence: the
information given is reliable and competent in relation to matters
concerned; or
• A professional advisor or expert — grounds for confidence: the
information given is regarded to be within the person’s professional
or expert competence; or
• Another director or offıcer — grounds for confidence: matters that
are within the director’s or officer’s authority; or
36 Associations (Model Constitution) Regulations 2004 (NT) reg 25; Associations
Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 28; Associations Incorporation Regulation 2010 (NSW) Sch
1, Model Rule 21; Associations Incorporation Regulation 1999 (Qld) reg 27; Associations
Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) Sch 4, Model Rule 43. South Australia,
Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory have no express provisions that
allows for the management committee to delegate powers to a sub-committee. Alternatively,
a management committee maybe capable of creating and delegating to a sub-committee as
the legislation in these jurisdictions provides for the ability of the association to alter the
constitution or rules, and this would see the creation of sub-committees. The altered rules
may go so far as to state the sub-committee’s purpose, responsibility and powers.
37 Corporation Act 2001 (Cth) s 198D.
38 Directors will not be liable if they believed, on reasonable grounds, that the delegate would
exercise their power, which is in line with the duties of the company’s directors, as required
by law, the company’s constitution, and in good faith — providing the director made proper
inquiry that the delegate was reliable and competent. Law Economic Reform Program Act
1999 (Cth) s 190(1)–(2).
39 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 189.
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• A committee of directors — grounds for confidence: matters within
the committee’s authority, and on which the director did not serve in
relation to such matters.40
To determine whether or not a director or an office holder within a Victorian
incorporated association has performed a duty of care and diligence under the
general law and statute, it must be shown that the director’s reliance was in
good faith.41 For a director’s reliance to be reasonable, a director should: make
an independent assessment of the information or advice; have their own
knowledge of the corporation’s operation; have knowledge of the company’s
and the corporation’s complex structure;42 and, that their reliance on the
information or advice can be said to be reasonable.43
Section 189 provides a safe harbour for directors to rely on the information
or advice from others without verification.44 This presumption is rebuttable if
a director knew, or by the exercise of their ordinary care should have known,
that any facts or issues would not be reasonable.45 The general law will also
look at the transaction’s risk and its nature, and the steps taken by the director
as to the reasonableness of the reliance.46
The legislative requirement for directors to undertake an independent
assessment of the information or advice requires directors to do more than
listen. They must assess the information or advice provided, and employ their
skill and judgment.47 The criticism aimed at this legislative requirement is that
it encourages directors to act alone instead of working as a collective, which
is how a board should operate.48
Section 588H and the Victorian Act provide a defence for directors and
Victorian office holders within an incorporated association if they can prove
that they relied on information about the company’s affairs provided to them
from a competent person.49 However, directors cannot rely upon this defence
if they have failed in their duty to prevent the company’s insolvent trading, or
by inadequately performing their general law and statutory duties.50 A
director’s failings would be a lack of participation in the company’s affairs,51
or the unreasonable reliance on other directors to look after the affairs of the
40 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 189(a)(i)–(iv).
41 Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 86(2)(b); Associations Incorporation
Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) Sch 4, Model Rule 45(4)(a).
42 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 189(b)–(c); Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012
(Vic) s 86(2)(b)(ii).
43 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 189(c).
44 ASIC v Adler (2002) 168 FLR 253; 41 ACSR 72; [2002] NSWSC 171; BC200200827.
45 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607 at 665-6.
46 Adler v ASIC (2003) 46 ACSR 504; (2003) 21 ACLC 1810; [2003] NSWCA 131;
BC200303670.
47 Southern Resources Ltd v Residues Treatment Trading Co Ltd (1990) 56 SASR 455; 3 ACSR
207; 8 ACLC 1151.
48 J Farrar, Corporate Governance — Theories, Principles and Practice, 3rd ed, Oxford
University Press, 2008, p 98.
49 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic)
s 86(2)(a)(i)–(iv).
50 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588G.
51 ASIC v Plymin (No 1) (2003) 175 FLR 124; (2003) 46 ACSR 126; [2003] VSC 123;
BC200302080.
46 (2014) 29 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
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company.52 Should a director not give the sufficient information to a person
needing to perform the task that that director wishes to rely upon, then a
s 588H defence would not be available.53
The statutory reliance for committee members of incorporated associations
is only available in South Australia and in Victoria. South Australia’s
provision54 is almost an exact reflection of s 189 of the Corporations Act 2001
(Cth), but the only point of difference being that a South Australian
association may rely on a sub-committee of association’s members, whereas
a company a director and an officer holder within a Victorian incorporated
association can rely on information or advice from others, such as an expert,
an employee, and other directors.55 The provisions on reliance for associations
in South Australia and Victoria are straightforward, but for all the other
Australian jurisdictions there is statutory silence.
Despite this silence, it is arguably open to a management committee, in
those jurisdictions without reliance provisions, to search out and rely on
information and professional or expert advice to assist them in the proper
administration of the association – and, moreover, to protect the association’s
property.
The duty of acting in good faith, in the best interest and
for proper purpose
This all-encompassing statutory duty focuses on different elements of ‘acting
in good faith, in the interest of the company for proper purpose’. Section 181
and s 85 of the Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) requires
that directors and other officers must exercise their powers and discharge their
duties in good faith, in the best interest of the corporation and the association,
and for a proper purpose.56 The duties to act in good faith and in the interest
of the company are viewed as a fundamental civil obligation for a director.57
How the courts test a contravention of this section is by an objective standard
based on what a comparable person, with the same knowledge and skills as the
director, would have done in the same circumstances.58 The rules regarding
best interest and proper purpose are discussed in detail below.
52 Metal Manufacturers Ltd v Lewis (1988) 13 NSWLR 315; 13 ACLR 357; 6 ACLC 725;
BC8801926.
53 Manpac Industries Pty Ltd v Ceccattini (2002) 20 ACLC 1304; [2002] NSWSC 330;
BC200201881.
54 Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 39AB.
55 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 189(a)(iv); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 39AB
(a)(iv); Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 86.
56 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). See also Associations Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012
(Vic) Sch 4, Model Rule 45(4)(b).
57 Ford, Austin and Ramsay, above n 6, p 513. The Note contained in s 85 of the Associations
Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) states that it has the same effect and application as
s 146 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Should an officer holder within a Victorian
incorporated association contravene s 85 the guilty person may be ordered by a court to pay
a pecuniary penalty of up to $20,000.
58 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 68; [1974] AC 821; (1974) 3
ALR 448; [1974] 1 All ER 1126.
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Best interest
The best interest of the company may be defined by the company’s
constitution, which would affect a director’s duties,59 and is generally linked
to the best interests of the shareholders as a general body.60 In circumstances
where different classes of shareholders have diverging interests, a director
must act fairly between the different classes.61 These classes of shareholders
under the corporation’s constitution allow the board to take into account the
interests of one group over another member group or, creditor.62 For an
incorporated association, the management committee could be required to
advance its objective that it is non-commercial.
Overall, incorporated associations must pursue their altruistic objectives,
which serve as an association’s best interest. Similar to a company, an
incorporated association allows for different groups of members, such as
financial, associate, or social members. Financial or active members confer
voting rights, whereas social or associate members do not have voting rights
and are confined to the enjoyment of the association’s facilities. Unlike a
company director, a management committee is not required to take into
account the interests of one group of members over another group.63 The
caution here for management committees and the board of directors is that a
departure from the rules or constitution may result in their treatment towards
members being seen as oppressive and unfairly prejudicial or discriminatory
to a specific group or class of members.
Proper purpose
The element of proper purpose under s 181(1)(d) of the Corporations Act64
requires directors and other officers to exercise their powers and discharge
their duties for a proper purpose.65 For a company director, this is conferred
by contract and legislation to exercise their powers for the expressed or
implied purpose.66 The ‘proper purpose’ doctrine for a company director is a
set of principles, which determines if a director has acted for an improper
purpose:67
• the fiduciary powers of directors are to be exercised for the purpose
for which they are given, not collateral purposes;
59 Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 285; 70 ALR 251; [1987] HCA 11;
BC8701766.
60 Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150; (1938) 11 ALJR 527; BC3890123.
61 Ibid.
62 Ford, Austin and Ramsay, above n 6, p 381.
63 Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1985) 180 CLR 459; 61 ALR 225; [1985]
HCA 68; BC8501065; Melbourne Juventis Soccer Club v Australian Soccer League Ltd
(unreported, FCA Vic, Onley J, 20 September 1995).
64 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); Gambotto v WCP Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 432; 127 ALR 417;
[1995] HCA 12; BC9506434.
65 Section 181 is a civil provision, whereas s 184 is a criminal provision for a director’s duty
of good faith within the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
66 Ford, Austin and Ramsay, above n 6, pp 400–1.
67 Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler (1994) 11 WAR 187; 14 ACSR 109; 12
ACLC 674; BC9406797.
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• the substantial purpose of directors was improper or collateral to the
director’s duties;68
• the acts performed by a director were for the benefit of the
company;69 and
• the court will apply the ‘but for’ test to determine what the director’s
relevant purpose was (ie, the court will consider if a director would
still have acted in the same manner had the collateral purpose not
existed).70
The element of proper purpose for a committee member would be to
achieve the association’s objectives conferred upon them by the association’s
rules and respective legislation. The absence of any provisions contained in
the association’s legislation across the jurisdictions, knowing whether or not
there is a duty to act for proper purpose upon a management committee, is
unclear.
The duty not to improperly use a position or information
This duty requires a company director, an officer and an employee not to
improperly use a position. For a company director this duty is a civil
obligation under s 182(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and they must
not improperly use their position to:
(a) gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or
(b) cause detriment to the corporation.
This provision overlaps with s 183(1), which states that a corporation’s
director, officer or employee are prohibited to obtain information by virtue of
their positions, and they must not use that information for a personal gain or
an advantage for someone else, or to cause detriment to the corporation.71
Some incorporated associations have provisions for the duty not to misuse
a position or information. However, the legislative framework varies between
jurisdictions. In New South Wales, Australian Capital Territory and Victoria
there is statutory duty not to improperly use information or a position, and
these provisions apply to committee members and former committee
members.72 However, in South Australia and the Northern Territory, this duty
applies to officers, former officers and employees — which is the same under
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Officers of incorporated associations in the
Australian Capital Territory only have a duty not to improperly use their
position.73
The provisions for misuse of information and position for incorporated
68 The determination is not whether a director’s decisions were bad or good, but whether they
acted in breach of their fiduciary duties: ibid.
69 This standard of testing for these principles is not whether the director acted honestly or
altruistically. A director’s conduct will be objectively assessed: ASIC v Adler (2002) 168
FLR 253; 41 ACSR 72; [2002] NSWSC 171; BC200200827.
70 Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 285; 70 ALR 251; [1987] HCA 11;
BC8701766 per Mason, Deane and Dawson JJ.
71 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
72 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) ss 32–33; Associations Incorporation Act 1981
(Vic) s 29A; Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 83. See also Associations
Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) Sch 4, Model Rule 45(5).
73 Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 111(1).
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associations in each jurisdiction uses the phrase ‘to gain, directly or indirectly,
any pecuniary benefit or material advantage for himself or herself or any other
person, or so as to cause a dettiment to the association’.74 This phrase for
incorporated associations is similar to the phrase that applies to corporations.
For corporations, this phrase is found in s 184(2)(a), which is a criminal
provision. Apart from New South Wales, the statutes for incorporated
associations have not separated these provisions into civil obligations or
criminal offenses like the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
The duties of a committee member differ between jurisdictions. The
sections concerning the improper use of position for management committees
in the Northern Territory, Victoria, South Australian and the Australian Capital
Territory directly reflect s 182(1) for corporations, that is: not to improperly
use their positions.75 The other two jurisdictions, New South Wales and
Victoria, have approached the improper use element in another way. Victoria’s
legislation states that members of the management committee must not
knowingly or recklessly make improper use of their position in the
association.76 The words ‘knowingly’ or ‘recklessly’ imports that a committee
member who contravenes this provision is conscious of the impropriety. The
Victorian provision for the improper use of a position by a committee member
follows the ruling in R v Byrnes,77 thus making the state of mind relevant
when testing a contravention objectively.
New South Wales has taken a different approach to the improper use of a
committee member’s position. Under s 33, committee members are guilty if
they use their position with intention of directly or indirectly gaining an
advantage for themselves or others, or if they cause detriment to the
association.78 The NSW provision follows the criminal offense of s 184(2)(a)
within the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). However, the NSW provision does
not contain the element of impropriety like the other jurisdictions and the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Rather, this provision itself is concerned with
intent and dishonesty. The consequences for breaching s 3379 replicates the
same penalties for contravening s 184(2),80 which is imprisonment, a
pecuniary penalty, or both.81 The NSW provision closely resembles the
fiduciary duty to act honestly, but it is the selection of the word ‘dishonesty’
that should be discussed further.82
74 Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 39A(3); Associations Act 2003 (NT)
s 33(2)–(3).
75 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 33(3); Associations
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 39A(3); Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 111(1).
76 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 29A(2); Associations Incorporation Reform Act
2012 (Vic) s 83(4).
77 (1995) 183 CLR 501; 130 ALR 529; [1995] HCA 1; BC9506451.
78 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW).
79 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW).
80 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
81 The NSW legislators are sending a strong public policy message to deter committee
members of acting dishonestly by imposing a criminal provision. Associations Incorporation
Act 2009 (NSW) s 33. The penalty for improperly using information or position is a civil
penalty up to $20,000, and a court may also order compensation to the effected incorporated
association. Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 83(5).
82 Phipps v Boardman [1967] 2 AC 46; [1966] 3 All ER 721; [1966] 3 WLR 1009.
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Regardless of what term is employed — ‘improper’, or ‘dishonest use of a
position’ — its reach and effect are alike. However, for New South Wales the
application of s 3383 is narrower than the respective provisions for
corporations and the jurisdictions of South Australia, the Northern Territory,
and the Australian Capital Territory.84 Being found guilty of breaching this
provision turns, and depends only, on the committee member’s awareness of
the wrongdoing. This narrow provision fails to provide for circumstances
where committee members have purportedly acted honestly, reasonably, and
without any intention of harm or an advantage, but have misused their
position.85
Duty not to improperly use information
Section 183 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) states that a director, an
officer, an employee who obtains information must not improperly use that
information to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else,86 or cause
detriment to the company.87 The main concept in this provision is the term
‘information’. Information is referred as the type of information that the law
of equity would restrict the director from using for a personal profit.88
Furthermore, a finding of improper use of information could be where a
director has failed to consider the general interests of a creditor that caused
detriment to the company.89 Breaching either of the impropriety provisions
will attract civil90 and/or criminal penalties.91
Similarly, the statutory provisions relating to the misuse of position for
incorporated associations are expressed as the improper use or dishonest use
of information. There are only four jurisdictions that have express provisions
within the incorporated associations’ legislative framework: Victoria; South
Australia; New South Wales; and the Northern Territory. The application of
these provisions regarding the misuse of information varies between each
jurisdiction. South Australia and the Northern Territory have provisions
similar to, and are as wide as, those provisions found in the Corporations Act
2001 (Cth); these apply to a current or former officer and employee of the
incorporated association.92 However, in New South Wales and Victoria, the
improper use of information only applies to current and former committee
members of the management committee and not to employees.93
The Australian Capital Territory has similar provisions that overlap between
83 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW).
84 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 182; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 39A(3);
Associations Act (NT) s 33(3); Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 111(1).
85 R v Towey (1996) 132 FLR 434; 21 ACSR 46 at 61; BC9602791.
86 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 183(1).
87 Ibid, s 182(2).
88 Rosetex Co Pty Ltd v Licata (1994) 12 ACLC 269; 12 ACSR 779; BC9402358 per Young J.
89 McNamara v Flavel (1988) 13 ACLR 619; 6 ACLC 802.
90 Civil penalties are in the forms of a pecuniary penalty order, disqualification order and or
compensation order. Such orders are proved on the balance of probabilities that a
contravention of ss 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
91 Ibid, s 214.
92 Associations Incorporated Act 1985 (SA) s 39A(2); Associations Act (NT) s 33(2);
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 183(1),(4).
93 Associations Incorporated Act 2009 (NSW) s 32; Associations Incorporated Act 1981 (Vic)
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the use of a position and information for members of a management
committee. Three out of the four jurisdictions prohibit the misuse of
information if it is ‘acquired by virtue of their position’.94 This phrase is not
expressed in the Corporation Act 2001 (Cth), but it is one factor from a list in
establishing a breach of s 183.95 Santow J in Forkserve Pty Ltd v Jack listed
a total of seven factors needed to prove that an officer of a corporation
breached s 183 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)96 — each one of these is
directly embraced into the incorporated associations’ statute for the
jurisdictions of South Australia, the Northern Territory and Victoria.97
Duty to disclose a personal interest
The statutory provisions regarding interested directors and members of a
management committee stem largely from the conflict rule. The conflict rule,
in general, prohibits directors placing themselves in a position where their
personal interest or duty will conflict with their duty to the company.98
However, applying this rule in its strictest form creates practical difficulties in
a commercial setting, such as prohibiting a director from holding a board
position, being a nominee director or a director being a shareholder. The
courts have acknowledged these difficulties and have accepted that a director
can act with a personal interest. However, this is prohibited if the personal
interest is not a bona fide concern for the benefit of the whole company or
fairness between members.99
For corporations, s 191(1) states that a director of a company with a
material interest in a matter that relates to the affairs of the company must give
notice to other directors of that interest unless s 191(2) says otherwise.100
There is strict liability by a director to notify other directors of a material
interest when a conflict arises.101 Further, this provision applies to all
directors, regardless of whether the company’s constitution permits a director
to be interested in a transaction with the company.102 The heart of this
s 29A(1); Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 83(1). See also Associations
Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012 (Vic) Sch 4, Model Rule 65, but this Rule is only
applicable to current committee members.
94 Associations Act (NT) s 33(2); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 29A(1);
Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 39A(2).
95 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); Forkserve Pty Ltd v Jack (2001) 19 ACLC 299; [2000]
NSWSC 1064; BC200007218.
96 (2001) 19 ACLC 299; [2000] NSWSC 1064; BC200007218.
97 The statutory provision in Victoria for the improper use of information also contains the
words ‘knowingly or recklessly’, which is consistent with the provision regarding the
improper use of a position by a member of a management committee and the ruling in R v
Byrnes (1995) 183 CLR 501; 130 ALR 529; [1995] HCA 1; BC9506451.
98 Ford, Austin and Ramsay, above n 6, p 528.
99 Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150; (1938) 11 ALJR 527; BC3890123.
100 This provision of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides for both public and proprietary
companies. However, s 191(1) will not apply to a proprietary company with only one
director. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 191(5).
101 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 191(1A).
102 A company’s constitution may outline procedures when the event of a conflict arises for a
director. Yet s 193 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that in addition to the
company’s constitution the key provision of s 191(1) has effect to restrict a director from
having material interest in a matter or holding an office involving duties or interest that
52 (2014) 29 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
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provision is that companies cannot allow themselves to diminish the general
prohibition on conflicts by the company’s constitution.
The term ‘material personal interest’ is not a term defined by the
Corporations Act, and the common law is consulted as to its meaning.103
Specifically, the word ‘material’ requires an assessment of what a director
personally expects and the matter being considered.104 This assessment looks
at the nature of the interest and the director’s capacity to influence the vote and
decision/s by the board and whether the conflict of interest is of a real and
substantial kind.105
Further, s 191(1) refers to an indirect or direct interest.106 A direct interest
is self-explanatory, but an indirect interest often involves a third party. For
instance, an indirect interest is when a director’s relative holds an interest and,
therefore, would benefit from a matter before the company’s board. In this
instance, it would be necessary to determine if there is a material personal
interest.107
There is a list of exceptions under s 191(2), which does not require a
director to provide disclosure or notice of an interest.108 From this list, only
one feature is focused on, as pointed out, some of the incorporated
association’s legislation has adopted a similar exception for committee
members. Subsequently, a director does not have to give notice to disclose an
interest if the interest arises because the director is a member of the company
held in common with other members of the company.109
Finally, the procedure on how a director’s interest is disclosed to the board
is set out in s 191(3).110 This provision stipulates that a director must, in their
notice to the board, outline sufficient details of the nature of the interest, the
extent of the interest, and the relation of the interest to the company’s
affairs.111 The notice of disclosure must be given to the board as soon as
practicable after the director becomes aware of the interest. Accordingly, the
notice must be detailed in the company’s minutes.
For a company, s 194 is a replaceable rule.112 Section 194 states that if a
director of a proprietary company has a material personal interest that relates
to the affairs of the company, and the director discloses the nature and the
extent of the interest in relation to the affairs of the company at a director’s
meeting then it is in accordance with s 191.113 Where a director’s interest does
not need to be disclosed under s 191, that director can vote on matters relating
conflict with their duties or interests as a director. A company’s constitution in this regard
must satisfy s 191 and not be in derogation of it: Centofanti v Eekimitor Pty Ltd (1995) 65
SASR 31; 15 ACSR 629; 13 ACLC 315; BC9503037.
103 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
104 Ford, Austin and Ramsay, above n 6, pp 555–6.
105 McGellin v Mount King Mining NL (unreported, WA SC, Murray J, CIV 1268/1997, 7 April
1998) BC9801129.
106 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
107 Ford, Austin and Ramsay, above n 6, p 556.
108 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
109 Ibid, s 191(2)(a)(i).
110 Ibid.
111 Camelot Resources Ltd v McDonald (1994) 14 ACSR 437; BC9402987.
112 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
113 Ibid.
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to the interest and the interested transactions.114 The vote may proceed and the
director can retain the benefit from the transaction providing the transaction
was entered into before the disclosure was made. Further, the company cannot
avoid the transaction because the interest exists.
The provisions in Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Australian
Capital Territory and Northern Territory deal with the disclosure of an officer’s
personal interest. Section 31(1) of the Northern Territory’s Associations Act
2003 states that a member of a committee who has a direct or indirect
pecuniary interest in a contract or proposed contract with the association, must
disclose the nature and the extent of the interest to the committee. The
committee member must disclose this interest as soon as the member becomes
aware and, further, the interests must be disclosed at the association’s Annual
General Meeting.115 This Northern Territory provision is clear as to how and
when a committee member is required to disclose a pecuniary interest. The
jurisdictions of Victoria, Australian Capital Territory, South Australia and
Western Australia have the same wording in their disclosure provisions.116
These state provisions are constructed differently from that of the
Corporations Act.117 The requirement of disclosure for incorporated
associations only occurs if there is a direct or indirect pecuniary interest for a
contract or a proposed contract; whereas, for a company director, there needs
to be a material personal interest in a matter relating to the affairs of the
company that could affect the board’s deliberation. Circumstances where
company directors must disclose their interests are wider than those for
committee members. For instance, a company director may be required to
disclose an interest relating to a transaction or in holding a specific position
within another company; whereas, for a committee member, the requirement
for disclosure only needs to be a mere interest, and it need only be disclosed
to the management committee. Disclosure provisions for incorporated
associations are restrictive, and this raises concerns that incorporated
associations’ legislation does not actively encourage sophisticated
transparency in disclosing information.
Parallel to s 191(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), incorporated
associations in Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia, and the Northern
Territory have provisions where management committee members do not have
to disclose their interests. Unlike s 191(2), the exceptions for incorporated
associations are fewer and more obscure than for corporations. Specifically,
committee members in the Northern Territory, Western Australia, South
Australia and Victoria are not required to disclose their interest to the
association if:
a. they are employees of the association; or
b. a member of a class of members for whose benefit the association is
established; or
114 Ibid.
115 Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 39(1)(a)–(b).
116 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 29B(1)–(2); Associations Incorporation Reform
Act 2012 (Vic) s 80; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 31(1); Associations
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 65(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 21.
117 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 191.
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c. the committee member’s pecuniary interest is in common with all or
a substantial proportion of the members of the association.118
Incorporated associations’ statutes provide that committee members with an
interest in a contract or proposed contract are not permitted to vote or take part
in the decision. However, an interested committee member can be present and
take part in the committee’s deliberations.119 The obvious concern here is that
the legislation allows for a committee member to wield his or her influence
and power over other members to vote for in a manner that will benefit his or
her interest. However, in Western Australia and Victoria, there are stricter
provisions compared to the other jurisdictions.120 An interested committee
member in both of these jurisdictions are forbidden to take part in any
deliberations or decisions of the committee,121 but the legislation in Western
Australia is silent in regards to allowing a committee member to vote on a
decision in relation to an interested contract.122 It can be said that a committee
member participating in the deliberations undermines the aims of a disclosure
regime.
Additionally, the timing and recording of a disclosed interest by committee
members appears to be consistent across the jurisdictions that have disclosure
provisions. These provisions require an interested committee member to
disclose the nature and extent of his or her interest to the management
committee as soon as they have become aware of the interest.123 Furthermore,
most of these jurisdictions (apart from Victoria) require the interested
committee member to disclose their interests at the next annual general
meeting of the association.124 The provision relating to recording an interest
by a management committee member exists only in Victoria, Western
Australia and the Northern Territory, where the interest of a committee
member must be recorded in the minutes of the management committee.125
Transparency or disclosure under these provisions takes a ‘bare foot’ approach
to disclosure. Disclosure at an association’s annual general meeting may
118 Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 31(2); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 29B(2);
Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) ss 80(3)–(4), 81(2); Associations
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 31(2); Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 21(2).
The ACT disclosure provision applies to committee members, but only if they are also
employees of the association: Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 65(3).
119 Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 32; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 65(2);
Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 31(5)–(6); Associations Incorporation Act
1985 (SA) s 31.
120 Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 21(1).
121 Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 22; Associations Incorporation Reform Act
2012 (Vic) s 81(1).
122 Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 22. Section 81(1)(b) prohibits a committee
member within a Victorian incorporated association to vote in a matter being considered by
the committee where the committee member has a material personal interest. Associations
Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic). See also Associations Incorporation Reform
Regulations 2012 (Vic) Sch 4, Model Rule 65(2)(b).
123 Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 21(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1985
(SA) s 31(1)(a); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 29B(1)(a); Associations
Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 80(1); Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 32(1)(a).
124 Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 21(1)(b); Associations Act 2003 (NT)
s 31(1)(b).
125 Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 21(4); Associations (Model Constitution)
Regulations 2004 (NT) reg 43; Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 80(6).
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transpire months after an interest has become a conflict, and only then would
the wider membership of the association become aware of the interest. This
statutory regime does very little to encourage transparency or sharing of
information, and this creates the risk of an ill-informed membership base and
a perception of a tainted management committee.
New South Wales and Queensland’s disclosure regime is widely different
from the other jurisdictions. Section 31 of NSW’ associations legislation
provides that if a committee member has a direct or indirect interest in a
matter being considered, or about to be considered, and the interest appears to
raise conflict with the proper performance of the committee member’s duties,
then the committee member must disclose the nature of the interest at a
committee meeting.126 This provision brings clarity to the duty of disclosing
an interest and neatly folds in the duty to avoid a conflict, which is absent from
the other jurisdictions. Unlike the other jurisdictions, the disclosure of an
interest in New South Wales is broader in all matters, like transactions,
agreements and other things, and not only contracts or proposed contracts.127
This provision encourages timely and efficient disclosure of a direct or indirect
interest being considered, or about to be considered, by a management
committee.
Pursuant to s 31(6), the committee must determine for itself whether the
interested member can be present during the committee’s deliberation, or
allow the interested member to take part in the committee’s
determination/decision regarding the relevant matter.128 However, before the
management can agree to allow the interested member to vote or be present
during deliberations, the interested member must give sufficient disclosure of
the nature of the interest.129 This would see that a real discussion with the
management committee would revolve around whether or not the interested
party’s decision would infringe upon his or her proper performance of their
duties.
Furthermore, New South Wales is more astute in recording a member’s
interest. The legislation states that the committee must keep a book for that
very purpose and must record all particulars of the disclosure.130 This book
must be open at all reasonable hours for any member of the association to
inspect; the book must be kept at the same address as the register of committee
members, and must be open to all members to inspect the book that they know
exists.131 New South Wales’ disclosure provisions may be considered as
exemplary for incorporated associations, and other jurisdictions should take
note.
Queensland’s provision regarding disclosure of an interest could, out of all
the jurisdictions, be judged as substandard. Regulation 23(8) provides that a
member of a management committee must not vote on a question about a
contract or proposed contract if the member has an interest in the contract or
proposed contract — and, if the member does vote, the vote cannot be
126 Incorporated Associations Act 2009 (NSW).
127 This interpretation of ‘matters’ lends itself from s 191(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
128 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW).
129 Ibid, s 31(2).
130 Ibid, s 32(3).
131 Ibid, s 32(3),(4).
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counted.132 However, this provision is silent on whether a member with an
interest is permitted to be present during deliberations.
Furthermore, unlike other jurisdictions, Queensland’s provision does not
outline any procedural requirements to guide an interested officer to disclose
the nature and the extent of his or her interest. Without a procedural
requirement as to when or where an interest is to be disclosed, it would be
tempting for a committee member not to disclose an interest, especially when
that person may benefit indirectly from this undisclosed interest — the
provision implies disclosure for a direct interest, which is very narrow
(emphasis added).
Another point of concern is that if the interested officer does not abstain
from the vote, how would this affect the validity of the contract? Unlike the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and associations in other jurisdictions,
Queensland’s regulation does not express whether or not a contravention of
the regulation would affect the validity of the contract. This conflict rule is
contained in all associations’ model rules. The lack of a disclosure
requirement by the association’s rules would inevitably lead to situations
where an interested member may have a court render the contract
unenforceable.133
Moreover, Queensland’s provision for disclosure is contained within the
subordinate legislation. This, unfortunately, does not provide any Queensland
incorporated association with any legal duties that regulates the behaviour of
a committee member under the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld).134
The construction of the provision at its core does not deal adequately with
transparency for members — it is a poor mechanism that does not afford a
management committee the opportunity for a discussion of the issue.
Despite the known shortcomings of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), it
does provide a solid framework for directors’ duties compared with the
associations’ legislation. Table 1 succinctly shows the statutory legal duties for
committee members across all jurisdictions are deficient and lag behind the
Corporations Act.135 However, the jurisdictions of South Australia, Northern
Territory, New South Wales and Victoria can be seen to have made
improvements with legal duties and obligations for an officer of a management
committee.
132 Associations Incorporation Regulations 1999 (Qld).
133 Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR 189; 4 ACSR 431; 9 ACLC 539.
134 Section 87 imposes a duty on the association’s secretary to register the association’s interest
in land: Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld).
135 2001 (Cth).
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Table 1 — Statutory duties of an incorporated association
compared to a company136
Filling the gaps in the statutory framework
There is a well-established body of common law and statutory duties that
prohibit company directors from abusing their powers and, moreover, their
position. For committee members, it is difficult to pinpoint a body of case law
that applies specifically to not-for-profit associations. There have been
encouraging developments in Victoria, South Australia and the Northern
Territory to impose positive statutory duties on committee members; however,
for incorporated associations operating in jurisdictions without these statutory
duty provisions, are there any rules that governs a committee member’s
conduct? The judgment of Owen J in the matter Haselhurst v Wright is
examined to answer this question.137
Justice Owen was asked to grant an injunction on the grounds that the
directors of a building society breached their fiduciary and common law
duties.138 Before there could be a decision regarding the injunction, Owen J
needed to look at a preliminary legal issue: if there was a breach, it first must
be established whether a duty existed. Investigating whether or not there were
legal duties owed by the building society’s officers, Owen J examined the
building society’s governing legislation. Similar to incorporated associations,
building societies have their own special legislation and are not touched by the
corporations’ law, and the building societies’ legislation offered no
136 Table 1 is adopted and modified from an article by Charles Parkinson entitled ‘Duties of
Committee Members under the Associations Incorporation Acts’ (2004) 30(1) Monash
University Law Review 75.
137 (1991) 4 ACSR 527; 9 ACLC 728; BC9101208.
138 Ibid, at [35].
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assistance.139 Owen J simply noted that the duties owed by the building
society’s officers ‘are to be found in the common law’. However, Owen J’s
statement is problematic on two grounds. First, there is no precedent that
applies or develops common law duties for the management committee of an
incorporated association.140 Second, Owen J does not advance his statement
by failing to recognise or pinpoint a substantive common law duty with which
an officer of the building society is obliged to comply. The application of
common law duties to officers of a management committee has shown to be
improbable due to the leading decision of Cameron v Hogan.141
Cameron v Hogan established a long-standing policy that the courts refrain
from interfering with the internal management and affairs of a voluntary
association.142 This negative and long-standing policy has allowed the courts
to regard many actions involving voluntary associations as non-justiciable.143
However, the courts in more recent times have shown some willingness to
intervene, but only where an association has infringed the rules of natural
justice and a member’s economic interests, livelihood or reputation.144
Despite the courts slowly moving away from the strict policy position of
Cameron v Hogan, would the courts go further and impose general law duties
and obligations upon an officer of a management committee?145 Most likely
not — the courts have shown further unease to speak with an authoritative
voice on matters involving voluntary associations, and where it seems
convenient, the courts will resort to the policy of Cameron v Hogan to dismiss
a claim.146 Incremental advances by the courts may, in the future, reach a point
139 Section 1A of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) expressly states that
incorporated associations registered in Queensland are excluded from s 5F of the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Other state and territory legislation have similar provisions in
their associations’ legislation. However, if an incorporated entity is limited by guarantee,
then the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) will apply.
140 Justice Johnson in the decision of Lai v Tiao (No 2) [2009] WASC 22; BC201000885 at [84]
acknowledged that there is no authority that establishes an officer of incorporated
associations owes common law duties.
141 (1934) 51 CLR 358; [1934] ALR 298; (1934) 8 ALJR 145; BC3400025.
142 Ibid. The reasons behind the High Court’s policy of non-intervention are: rooted in
nineteenth century view of the limits of judicial intervention; a respect for the association’s
privacy; and a fear that trivial and vexatious disputes will be encouraged which subsequently
will open the ‘floodgates’ to litigation. J Forbes, ‘Judicial Review of Political Parties’,
Research Paper No 21, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 1995–1996, p 3.
143 See also Carberry v Drice as Representative of Brisbane Junior Rugby Union [2011] QSC
016; BC201100522; Islamic Council of South Australia Inc v Australian Federation of
Islamic Councils Inc [2009] NSWSC 211; BC200901945; Metropolitan Petar v Mitreski
[2003] NSWSC 1007; BC200306541; Skelton v Australian Rugby Union Ltd [2003] QSC
193; BC200303338; Rush v WA Amateur Football Club League (Inc) [2001] WASC 154;
BC200103078; Clarke v ALP (SA Branch) [1999] SASC 415; BC9906355; Plenty v Seventh
Day Adventist Church of Port Pirie (1986) 43 SASR 121; Heale v Philips [1959] Qd R 489;
Abbott v National Coursing Association of South Australia [1941] SASR 140.
144 See Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353; [1972] ALR 370; (1971) 46 ALJR 23;
BC7100400; Nurses Memorial Centre of South Australia v Beaumont (1987) 44 SASR 454;
Carter v NSW Netball Association [2004] NSWSC 737; BC200405171; Dixon v Australian
Society of Accountants (1989) 18 ALD 102; 87 ACTR 1; 95 FLR 231.
145 (1934) 51 CLR 358; [1934] ALR 298; (1934) 8 ALJR 145; BC3400025.
146 Ibid. Carberry v Drice as Representative of Brisbane Junior Rugby Union [2011] QSC 016;
BC201100522; Islamic Council of South Australia Inc v Australian Federation of Islamic
Councils Inc [2009] NSWSC 211; BC200901945.
Legal duties as part of the governance framework 59
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 66 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Mon Apr 14 12:10:10 2014
/journals/journal/ajcl/vol29pt1/part_1
where the judiciary will no longer consider issues involving voluntary
associations as novel or insignificant, and the courts may be more reticent in
developing the common law duties specifically for voluntary associations.147
Returning again to Owen J’s judgment, he held that fiduciary duties were
owed by the society’s directors to the body corporate, and the society’s
directors are to act in the society’s best interest (as a whole) and to avoid being
motivated by self-interest.148
Fiduciary duties and obligations
Is an officer of a management committee a fiduciary?
The ruling in Haselhurst v Wright is confined to a building society, and
Owen J does not elaborate his finding as to why these specific directors are
fiduciaries.149 This shortfall in this decision makes it difficult to conclude with
any certainty as to whether officers of an incorporated association are also
fiduciaries. Yet, the important aspect from Owen J’s comment is that fiduciary
duties are ‘owed to the body corporate’.150 As it is known, an incorporated
association is a body corporate with perpetual succession and, for that reason,
it is sound to conclude that under Owen J’s finding this could be applied to an
officer of a management committee and, therefore, conclude an officer of a
management committee are fiduciaries and owe fiduciary duties to its
association.151
The fiduciary doctrine
There are a number of established legal relationships that give rise to fiduciary
obligations and duties. These well-known, established categories are: trustee
and beneficiary; principle and agent; employee and employer; solicitor and
client; and director and company and partners.152 While these fiduciary
categories are not closed, the task still remains difficult to identify a fiduciary
in novel relationships due to the judiciary not establishing a strict formula to
identify a fiduciary.153
147 The increased activity by parliament legislating regarding not-for-profit organisations may
subsequently result in the courts’ role to interpreting and giving effect to what parliament has
legislated.
148 Haselhurst v Wright (1991) 4 ACSR 527; 9 ACLC 728; BC9101208 at [40], [45].
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 The respective state legislative provisions which confirms an incorporated association (upon
registration) to be a body corporate are: Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 21;
Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 8; Associations Incorporation Act 1991
(ACT) s 22; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 38(2); Associations Incorporation
Act 1964 (Tas) s 11(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 20(3); Associations
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 10(a); Associations Act 2003 (NT) s 11(a).
152 P Latimer, Australian Business Law, 30th ed, CCH, 2011, p 744; P Finn, ‘The Fiduciary
Principle’ in T G Youdan (Ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts, Carswell, 1989, pp 1, 33–41.
153 Virginia Surety Company Inc v Dumbrell [2011] VSC 602; BC201110762; D Ong, Trusts
Law in Australia, 3rd ed, Federation Press, 2007, p 540. Attesting to the slow development
of the fiduciary principle is Mason J who remarks that ‘the fiduciary relationship is a concept
in search of a principle’. Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Themes and Prospects’ in P D Finn (Ed),
Essays in Equity, Thomson Reuters, 1985, p 246. Adding to the tempered vagueness of
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Outside the established category of a charitable trustee and beneficiary, the
task of identifying a fiduciary relationship existing in the not-for-profit context
is not as obvious. Both Seivers and Latimer state that a committee member of
an unincorporated association may have fiduciary obligations to members
(emphasis added).154 This carte blanche statement, in the same way as Owen J,
is made without explanation or justification. While on the surface it may seem
obvious, however, it is not easy to denote that a committee member is a
fiduciary. The fundamental question always asked when trying to establish a
fiduciary relationship is: what is a fiduciary? This question too cannot always
be simply answered.
What is a fiduciary?
The general approach taken by the Australian courts in identifying a fiduciary
is founded in a legal relationship155 that is outside the parties’ legal obligations
in contract and torts.156 The parties’ legal relationship will be of a particular
nature, which exhibits trust and confidence, where the fiduciary will undertake
to, or agree, to act for or on behalf of another person.157 Acting on behalf of
another provides the fiduciary with discretion to exercise power that will affect
the interest of somebody who, within this relationship, is in a position of
disadvantage and venerability.158 This description of a fiduciary relationship
outlines particular characteristics that can easily be applied to an officer of an
unincorporated and incorporated association. The application of these features
can be seen when an individual takes on the role of an officer of the
management committee: they undertake to act for the interests of the
association. Further, by acting on behalf of the association, an officer has the
power and the discretion (by virtue of his or her position) to make decisions
that will affect the association and its members. An officer is trusted to make
decisions that will benefit the association and its members. However, this
arrangement places members in vulnerable position where an officer can abuse
the power and position.159 Hence, it is very easy to see why Sievers and
fiduciary is expressed by Jacobson J that is, ‘the term “fiduciary relationship” defies
definition’. ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 113 114 832) (No 4)
(2007) 160 FCR 35; 241 ALR 705; [2007] FCA 963; BC200704944 at [270].
154 A S Seivers, Associations and Clubs Laws in Australia and New Zealand, 3rd ed, Federation
Press, 2010, p 17; Latimer, above n 152, 744.
155 See Hospital Products Ltd v US Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41; 55 ALR 417;
[1984] HCA 64; BC8400480; Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 449; 144 ALR 729;
[1997] HCA 23; BC9702653; Estate Realties Ltd v Wignall [1991] 3 NZLR 482.
156 P Radan and C Stewart, Principles of Australian Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2010, p 181.
157 Hospital Products Ltd v US Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 at 96 per Mason J; 55
ALR 417; [1984] HCA 64; BC8400480.
158 Ibid, at CLR 96, 142 per Mason and Dawson JJ.
159 The feature of trust is impulsive due to the notion that not-for-profit organisations are more
trustworthy than for-profits as a consequence of information asymmetry, contract failure and
the perception that an officer is wholesome and selfless when perusing and undertaking the
association’s unadulterated and altruistic purposes. See D Young, ‘Alternative Models of
Government-Nonprofit Sector Relations: Theoretical and International Perspectives’ (2000)
29 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 149 at 154; L Salamon, ‘Putting the Civil
Society Sector on the Economic Map of the World’ (2010) 81(2) Annals of Public and
Cooperative Economics 167 at 168–9.
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Latimer concluded that officers of unincorporated and incorporated
associations are fiduciaries and, therefore, owe fiduciary duties. However,
doubt remains over whether the last characteristic of vulnerability is truly
present in the relationship between an officer and the association’s members.
There are possibilities where members of the association and its property
are vulnerable to abuse by an officer of the management committee. Giving
rise to this possibility is the statutory power of control and power vested in the
management committee to operate and conduct the association’s business.160
This unqualified power allows an officer of a management committee to make
decisions about the association’s affairs and property without the need for the
membership base to be involved or consulted in the decision-making
process.161 However, to counterbalance this exclusive power, the association’s
rules provide members with voting rights.162 Each member of an association
has one vote, and the rules provide that a majority of members present can
decide on matters by way of a resolution at a general meeting.163 This
facilitates a democratic method of decision-making that ensures the
administration of the association is being conducted in a proper manner.
However, where members do not have voting rights, the management of the
organisation is centralised amongst an exclusive few individuals, and this will
create a private sphere. Within this private sphere, all the decisions regarding
the management of the association will be made. How decisions are made and
how individuals conduct themselves within this sanctum is out of view
without the need to be answerable to the membership base.164 Acting
independently to the rest of the association, this private sphere will become
insular, allowing an individual to act bona fide in self-interest. The
management of the association falls upon the shoulders of a few, and these few
individuals will become highly involved in the association and possess the
necessary knowledge on how to manage it. Members will come to trust and
blindly accept any information provided by these individuals. This will allow
the dominant personalities to orchestrate the numbers amongst the
membership base to support their agenda — this can occur regardless of
160 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 60(1).
161 For example, in Queensland the management committee must decide whether there is a need
for the association to take out public liability insurance and the amount of public liability
insurance. This decision by the management committee in regards to not taking out public
liability insurance is to be reported at the association’s annual general meetings.
Associations Incorporation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Qld) ss 70, 70A.
162 Associations Incorporation Regulations 1999 reg 38(2); Associations Incorporation
Regulations 2010 (NSW) reg 22(2); Associations Incorporation Regulations 1991 (ACT) reg
20(2); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 29(5); Associations Incorporation
Regulations 2009 (Vic) reg 16(1); Associations Incorporation (Model Rules) Regulations
2007 (Tas) reg 18(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1988 (WA) 1987 s 24; Associations
(Model Constitution) Regulations 2004 (NT) reg 40(1). There is no provision within the
Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) nor its accompanying regulations which expressly
states that a member has one vote. However, the publication entitled An Example of Rules
for Incorporated Associations produced by the Government of South Australia, Consumers
and Business Services states that a member of an incorporated association has only one vote:
at <http://www.ocba.sa.gov.au/assets/files/02_association_rules.pdf>, p 12 (undated).
163 Association Incorporation Regulations 1999 (Qld) Sch 4, reg 38.
164 Weinert, above n 1, p 53.
62 (2014) 29 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 69 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Mon Apr 14 12:10:10 2014
/journals/journal/ajcl/vol29pt1/part_1
whether members have voting rights or not.165 The private sphere that emerges
in this instance is because these few individuals have a monopoly in the
management of the organisation. Worst of all, the structure of associations
allows such individuals to self-regulate, which will permit any acts of
self-interest or other misdeeds to be hidden from the membership base and,
consequently, members would be in a vulnerable situation. However, the
finding of a fiduciary relationship in a novel situation remains an impossible
task, despite the presence of venerability.166
The courts are highly reluctant to impose a higher standard of conduct
prescribed under equity to those in a ‘relative equal position’.167 Further
reluctance by the court to impose fiduciary obligations will bring about
uncertainty in a commercial context.168 While the relationship between an
officer and member is not commercial in nature, the relationship is, however,
contractual; it this aspect of the parties’ relationship that the courts would
focus upon.169
The finding that an officer of an organisation is a fiduciary seems unlikely.
Identifying the core of an officer’s relationship to another member and to the
association itself is rooted in contract and, moreover, this contract places each
officer and member on an equal footing. The courts would prefer to elicit an
officer’s and a member’s obligations from contract and not draw upon stricter
equity principles that may alter the operation of the contract.170 Although
courts seem impervious to a plea of a fiduciary relationship, they will,
however, afford the opportunity for a party to argue for a finding of a fiduciary
relationship.171
The opportunity to argue that an officer of a not-for-profit organisation was
a fiduciary happened in the Canadian case of London Humane Society (Re).172
Here it was found that an officer of a not-for-profit organisation was a
fiduciary due to their discretion over the organisation’s property — the interest
remained vested in the organisation, not the members.173 Therefore, an officer
of a not-for-profit organisation is in a fiduciary relationship with the
organisation itself,174 and the public.175 These findings by the Canadian courts
165 McClelland v Burning Palms Surf Lifesaving Club (2002) 191 ALR 759; [2002] NSWSC
470; BC200203189.
166 Hospital Products Ltd V United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41; 55 ALR 417;
[1984] HCA 64; BC8400480.
167 A Mason, ‘The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law
World’ (1994) 110 Law Quarterly Review 238 at 238.
168 S White, ‘Commercial Relationships and the Burgeoning Fiduciary Principle’ (2000) 9(1)
Griffıth LRev 98 at 99. Dawson J expressed that confusion and uncertainty will occur in
commercial dealings if the fiduciary principle was imposed: Hospital Products Ltd v US
Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41; 55 ALR 417; [1984] HCA 64; BC8400480
at [494].
169 The rules of an incorporated association operate as a contract between the association and its
members: McClelland v Burning Palms Surf Life Saving Club (2002) 191 ALR 759; [2002]
NSWSC 470; BC200203189.
170 Hospital Products Ltd V US Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41; 55 ALR 417; [1984] HCA
64; BC8400480 at [97] per Mason J.
171 Virginia Surety Company Inc v Dumbrell [2011] VSC 602; BC201110762 at [35].
172 (2010) ONSC 5775.
173 Ibid.
174 London Humane Society (Re) (2010) ONSC 5775.
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are not surprising. Compared with Australia, the development of fiduciary law
in Canada has been progressive, and the fiduciary doctrine has been widened
to include relationships where there are non-economic interests.176
Furthermore, the analysis of a fiduciary relationship is prescriptive, which
subsequently has created a ‘catch-all’ situation, unlike Australia’s approach,
which is prospective.177 However, it remains to be seen whether the Australian
judiciary would be amenable to view an officer of an incorporated association
as a fiduciary.
The law confers some nominal statutory duties, but no rules to govern the
conduct of an officer who has control of an association’s funds and property.
This is unacceptable and, therefore, a different view of an officer of a
voluntary association is needed to find and recognise some rules of obligations
that are applicable to an officer of an association. This alternative view would
be to see an officer as an ‘agent’ of the association.
Principal agent relationship
Viewing an officer as an agent the law would subject that person’s conduct to
certain duties and obligations. The decision and policy of Cameron v Hogan
has repeatedly been shown to be a barrier for the courts to adequately deal
with grievances involving a not-for-profit organisation — as surprising as it
may seem, Cameron v Hogan can be helpful in identifying an officer as an
agent.178 The majority stated in Cameron that officers may be agents for the
members of the association and, furthermore, stated that upon there being no
doctrine of agency, an association’s members are joint principals who can hold
an officer and the committee responsible.179
The incorporated association legislation offers some guidance in knowing
whether an officer of a management committee is an agent; however, there
remains inconsistency across most of the jurisdictions. Queensland is the only
jurisdiction that expressly states every member of the management committee,
and any manager appointed by the management committee, are deemed to be
agents of the association.180 However, the remaining jurisdictions do not
provide such clarity.
New South Wales’ incorporated association’s legislation notes that any
people who hold themselves out to be an agent of the association can make the
175 The court found that the fiduciary relationship between an officer and the public is largely
due to the public making donations to the organisation: Pathak v Hindu Sabha (2004) OJ No
1981.
176 Frame v Smith (1987) 42 DLR (4th) 81.
177 Norberg v Wynrib (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 449; L Rotman, ‘Fiduciary Doctrine: A Concept in
Need of Understanding’ (1996) 34(4) Alberta L Rev 821 at 833.
178 In more recent times, the lower courts have shown their preparedness to hear disputes
regarding the members of an incorporated association. While these decisions found there to
be a breach of natural justice, the courts did not find a member’s contractual interests and
rights were infringed. See Rose v Boxing NSW Inc [2007] NSWSC 20; BC200700280 and
Goodwin v VVMC Club Australia (NSW Chapter) (2008) 72 NSWLR 224; [2008] NSWSC
154; BC200800991. Both of these judgments found that the association had inadequately
dealt with a dispute with a member and ordered compensation.
179 Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358; [1934] ALR 298; (1934) 8 ALJR 145; BC3400025
per Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ; Kelly v National Society of Operative Printers
(1916) 113 LT 1055.
180 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 60(2).
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assumption that this person is duly appointed and has the authority to be an
agent.181 This provision is a direct reflection of the indoor management rule
found in s 129 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Furthermore, s 126 of the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the New South Wales’Act state that an agent
has an association’s expressed and implied authority to make, vary, ratify or
discharge a contract on behalf of the association.182 These provisions in the
NSW’ statute are wide, and they do not specify how and who within the
association can be appointed as an agent. The danger of these provisions is
that any person purporting to be an agent may bind an association to a contract
or transaction that the association may not know about, want, or is within the
purpose of the association. These provisions strongly imply that an
association’s agent is entrusted to undertake dealings in good faith. While
under the general law an unruly agent may be personally liable for their
actions, the legislation does not provide any liability provisions for agents or
individuals purporting to be agents. However, the other states provide stricter
provisions relating to an agent’s conduct.
Respective legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, Western Australia,
South Australia and Victoria states that an agent may execute documents and
deeds under the association’s common seal.183 These jurisdictions require an
agent to be appointed in writing and the agent’s authority continues only for
a period specified in the instrument that confers the agent’s authority — and,
if no period is stated, revocation or termination of the agent’s authority by way
of notice.184 These provisions can be assessed to be applicable only to the
association appointing a specific individual to undertake a one-off task, such
as purchasing property. Nothing within these jurisdictions suggests a member
or an officer of the management committee is automatically an agent. The
jurisdictions of the Tasmania and the Northern Territory contain no provisions
that allow for the appointment of an agent to act on the association’s behalf.
These gaps in the legislation raise two queries. First, whether officers of a
management committee are agents for the association in the jurisdictions of
South and Western Australia, Victoria, Tasmania and the Northern Territory;
and, second, whether is it probable that associations in Tasmania and the
Northern Territory have the power to appoint an agent. The last relies on the
legal instrument that provides an association with a juristic personality. This,
subsequently, allows an association to have the legal capacity to exercise
powers to carry out the organisation’s business, which endows an association
the ability to enter into contracts.185 This juristic personality permits an
association to appoint an agent by contract or in writing to act on behalf of the
181 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 24(4).
182 Ibid, s 21(1).
183 Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 55(2); Associations Incorporation Act 1991
(SA) s 55(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 19(7); Associations Incorporation
Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 39; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 13(1)(f).
184 Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (SA) s 55(2),(3); Associations Incorporation Act 1981
(Vic) s 19(8); Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 39(3).
185 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 25; Associations Incorporation Act 2009
(NSW) ss 19, 21; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 42; Associations
Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 19; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 20;
Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 26; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA)
ss 14, 20; Associations Act 2003 (NT) Pt 4.
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association. However, with regards to the first query (whether an officer is an
agent in the remaining jurisdictions) remains unclear and, therefore, attention
is turned to the general law.
The Cameron v Hogan decision provides a clear answer to the query — the
majority stated that an officer may be an agent for the association and its
members.186 Their Honours failed to explain why an officer is an agent and,
in the absence of any judicial reasoning, it may be presumed that a finding of
agency arises out of necessity to carry out transactions and the association’s
activities — regardless of whether the association is incorporated or
unincorporated.
Nevertheless, there is some difficulty determining whether an individual
committee member of an unincorporated association is an agent due to the law
not recognising this particular form as a juristic entity and, furthermore, any
transaction or contract involving an unincorporated association needs to be in
the officer’s own name.187 However, these concerns are overcome by the
decision of Kelly v National Society of Operative Printers.188 Here, the
majority found that an officer of an unincorporated body is an agent.189 An
officer acting as an agent of either incorporated or unincorporated associations
will not receive remuneration, nor will the agent be subject to an enforceable
contract of agency. Therefore, in the absence of an enforceable contract, an
officer would be found to be a gratuitous agent.190 Once an agency relationship
has been established, it must be determined what is the agent’s authority.191
An agent’s authority
The scope of an agent’s authority is important when considering whether the
agent has acted outside his or her authority and, consequently, would lose the
right of indemnity for their actions. The types of authority are: (a) actual
authority, implied and expressed; (b) ostensible authority; and (c)
retrospective authority.192
The type of authority conferred upon an agent derives from the source that
creates the agency and principle relationship. As already established, an officer
of an incorporated association is an agent under the respective association
legislation that provides an agent (officer) with actual authority. The agent
being conferred with the authority to perform particular acts in the name of the
association creates this actual authority. Furthermore, an officer’s actual
authority may be implied by the agent’s conduct, the circumstances, or
186 Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358; [1934] ALR 298; (1934) 8 ALJR 145; BC3400025
per Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ.
187 Freeman v McManus [1958] VR 15; [1958] ALR 201; Carlton Cricket and Football Social
Club v Joseph [1970] VR 487.
188 (1916) 113 LT 1005.
189 Ibid, at 1058, 1062 per Swinfen Eady LJ, Phillimore LJ and Bankes LJ.
190 Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Co of Europe Ltd v Orion Marine Insurance Underwriting
Agency Ltd [1995] QB 174 at 185; [1995] 3 All ER 211; [1995] 2 WLR 49.
191 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v ECGD [2000] 1 AC 486; [1999] 1 All ER 929; [1999]
2 WLR 540; [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 563.
192 S Fisher, Agency Law, Butterworths, 2000, pp 32–9.
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activities that are incidental to the association’s activities.193 The rules
governing an agent’s apparent authority (regardless whether it is expressed or
implied) the doctrine of ultra vires may be a consequence for an officer who
has acted outside his or her authority.
The doctrine of ultra vires has been disposed of by the association
legislation. Under the associations’ statute, the ultra vires rule has been altered
regarding the power of an officer to enter into a binding agreement with the
association — it shall not be invalid where the association did not have the
power or the capacity to do such an act or to execute the document.194 Where
an association lacks the power to execute a transaction, the courts are willing
to remedy this through the rules of constructive trust — especially where
unincorporated associations are involved.195 Despite the doctrine of ultra vires
being set aside by statute, the conduct of an agent of an incorporated
association will remain subject to the recognised general law duties of an
agent.
Duties of an agent
The principal and agent relationship gives rise to certain and onerous duties
for an agent.196 Justice McCardie in Armstrong v Jackson stated that these
particular and onerous duties are due to the agent’s position of confidentiality,
and situations that can lend themselves to abuse, or to be taken advantage of
and, therefore, requires the agent’s conduct to be of a high standard.197 The
essence of McCardie J’s judgement illustrates that there is a fiduciary
dimension to the principal agent relationship and that strict equitable
principles apply.198 Gibbs CJ and Mason J in Hospital Products Ltd v US
Surgical Corp also support this position by recognising that the principal
agency relationship is a fiduciary relationship.199 Further, to the strict
equitable obligations owed by an agent to the principle that arises from the
special position of trust, there are also an agent’s contractual duties.200
The respective incorporated association legislation allows an officer to
operate as an agent of the association; however, neither the statute nor the
association’s rules provide an agent with any rules, duties or obligations
193 Verdi Club Inc v National Australia Bank (1991) 104 FLR 344; R Munday, Agency Law and
Principles, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp 48–51.
194 Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 26; Associations Incorporation Act 2009
(NSW) s 20; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 56; Associations Incorporation
Act 1981 (Vic) s 17; Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic) s 35; Associations
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 27; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 15.
Constructive notice will not be discussed, as it is not in the scope of this article.
195 Worthing Rugby Football Club v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1985] 1 WLR 409; [1985]
STC 186;. There are numerous pragmatic difficulties which an unincorporated association
experiences largely due to its poor legal standing.
196 Armstrong v Jackson [1917] 2 KB 822 at 826 per McCardie J.
197 Ibid, at 826.
198 Ibid, at 825–6 per McCardie J.
199 (1984) 156 CLR 41; 55 ALR 417; [1984] HCA 64; BC8400480 at [68], [96] per Gibbs CJ
and Mason J.
200 Rothschild v Brookman (1831) 5 Bli (NS) 165 at 197; O’Sullivan v Management Agency and
Music Ltd [1985] QB 428 at 451; (1984) 2 IPR 499; [1985] 3 All ER 351; [1984] 3 WLR
448; Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716; [1965] 2 All ER 725; [1965] 3 WLR
276.
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specific to an agent.201 Therefore, it is plausible to find an officer as a
gratuitous agent due to the absence of remuneration and an enforceable
contract.202 Establishing that an officer is a gratuitous agent poses the
question: does that officer owe the association the fiduciary duties of an agent
or a lesser duty of care?203
Where an officer is a gratuitous agent (appointed by statute), it is reasonable
for an association to rely and trust on that agent’s skill and judgement.
However, the members must also have confidence that an agent’s performance
will be carried out in in accordance with the fiduciary duties of an agent.204
The fiduciary duties owed by an agent are as follows:
1. no conflict rule — officers must not be in conflict with the association
and they should not take advantage if a conflict arises;205
2. no profit rule — an officer must not receive a profit at the expense of
the association;206
3. duty of loyalty — an officer must make all the relevant information
available to the association;207 and
4. duty of confidentiality — any information obtained by the officer for
the association must not be used by that officer for a private
advantage.208
Conversely, the required level of care a gratuitous agent owes a principal is
declared to be what might be reasonably accepted in the circumstances and,
furthermore, judged objectively.209 This means that an agent’s actual degree of
skill and experience, or the skill and experience that the agent has laid on
themselves.210
The strictness of these fiduciary duties for officers raises the old argument
that it would be unreasonable to expect volunteers to satisfy this high standard
on the basis that individuals are acting out of prevailing social mores. The
courts would give strong consideration to this argument, and would more than
likely find that the lower common law duty applies. Where officers do not hold
themselves out to have a special skill or knowledge, the court has held that,
in the circumstances, a gratuitous agent will be held to the standard of care of
201 Many incorporated associations rely and operate on the efforts of volunteers who occupy
positions on the management committee, and it would be a fair assessment that these
volunteers generally would not have any knowledge or understanding of an agent’s duties.
Therefore, the respective incorporated associations legislation should outline these
obligations.
202 An association’s rules can be read to have the effect of a contract: Islamic Council of South
Australia Inc v Australian Federation of Islamic Council Inc [2009] NSWSC 211;
BC200901945; Liddle v Central Australian Legal Aid Service Inc [1999] NTSC 35.
203 Chaudhry v Prabakhar [1989] 1 WLR 29; [1988] 3 All ER 718.
204 Bristol & West BS v Mathew [1998] Ch 1 at 18 per Millett LJ; [1996] 4 All ER 698; [1997]
2 WLR 436.
205 Western Areas Exploration Pty Ltd v Streeter (No 3) (2009) 234 FLR 265; (2009) 73 ACSR
494; [2009] WASC 213; BC200906821 at [48].
206 Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554; [1916-17] All ER Rep 285; (1916) 27 DLR 1.
207 Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71; 138 ALR 259; [1996] HCA 57; BC9604086.
208 Morison v Moat (1851) 68 ER 492 at 898.
209 Chaudhry v Prabakhar [1989] 1 WLR 29; [1988] 3 All ER 718 per Stocker and
Stuart-Smith LJJ.
210 Ibid.
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a competent agent when carrying out the business of the association.211 The
court held there are no grounds to exempt a gratuitous agent from a duty of
care when they are entrusted to carry out a task.212 Hence, officers of
incorporated and unincorporated associations acting as an agent for them can
be a fiduciary — but it is more than likely a court will hold an agent to a
minimal standard of care and not to strict fiduciary obligations.
Conclusion
There are some similarities between the roles and functions of a company
director and an officer of a management committee. Both operate as a
collective group of individuals who are in control of and manage their
respective entity’s property and carry out the operation and business. There is
very little known about how a management committee carries out these
functions. There is, of course, a desired presumption and expectation that a
management committee of an association manages in accordance with the
association’s altruistic mission. However, the altruistic mission can no longer
be a shield to deflect the need for better accountability and transparency of
not-for-profit organisations.
There are overwhelming social and economic reasons to justify the call for
better transparency and accountability through a governance framework
within not-for-profit organisations. Unfortunately, the law relating to
incorporated associations does very little to encourage a management
committee to achieve transparency and accountability, or to promote a
governance framework that protects an association’s property and controls
risk. Legal duties and obligations are important mechanisms of organisational
governance, and an examination of legal duties for incorporated associations
reveals a number of shortcomings.
This article first analysed an officer’s statutory duties across state and
territory jurisdictions. This analysis illustrated that New South Wales,
Victoria, South Australia and the Northern Territory have more statutory
duties compared to the other jurisdictions. Furthermore, these jurisdictions
have made advances and improvements by introducing some statutory duties.
Table 1 succinctly shows the statutory duties of committee members across all
Australian jurisdictions, and demonstrates inconsistencies in statutory duties
for officers of a management committee. Where there are significant gaps in
the legislation, the general law is considered.
The general law has proved unhelpful in ascertaining whether an officer of
a management committee is subject to common law duties. There are no
common law duties due to the long-standing decision of Cameron v Hogan,213
which set the precedent that, in the absence of a proprietary right or interest
in the property of the association, any issue regarding the internal
management of a voluntary association is non-justiciable. Despite incremental
advances by the courts to intervene in some matters involving the internal
management of voluntary associations, the courts have, however, been
211 Norwest Refrigeration Services Pty Ltd v Bain Dawes (WA) Pty Ltd (1984) 157 CLR 149 at
168–70 per Brennan J; 55 ALR 509; [1984] HCA 59; BC8400481.
212 Ibid.
213 (1934) 51 CLR 358; [1934] ALR 298; (1934) 8 ALJR 145; BC3400025.
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reluctant to develop common law duties for officers of a voluntary association.
This article shows that, in a number of cases, it has been held that an officer
owes some general law duties. Where the common law has shown to be scant,
the fiduciary law has been shown to be of some assistance.
However, for fiduciary duties to be owed, it must be established that an
officer is a fiduciary and that an officer has a fiduciary relationship with the
association. The established fiduciary categories do not include an officer of a
management committee or a voluntary association.
The courts do not wish to hold an individual to stricter or a higher standard
of conduct especially where the parties are in a relatively equal position by
showing that an officer and a member of an association are in an equal
position. With very few statutory, common law and fiduciary duties affecting
the conduct of an officer an alternative view of the role of the officer is needed.
Identifying an officer as an agent will, in fact, subject that officer’s conduct
to strict fiduciary duties in particular circumstances. The circumstances in
which an agent owes fiduciary duties were clearly stated by Lord Denning MR
in Boardman v Phipps when he said:
if an agent uses property, with which he has been entrusted by his principal, so as
to make a profit for himself out of it, without his principal’s consent, then he is
accountable to his principal . . . So, also, if he uses a position of authority, to which
has been appointed by his principal, so as to gain money by means of it for himself,
then also he is accountable to his principal for it . . . Likewise with information or
knowledge which he has been employed by his principal to collect or discover, or
which he has otherwise acquired, for the use of the principal, then again if he turns
it to his own use, so as to make a profit by means of it for himself, he is accountable
. . . for such information or knowledge is the property of his principal, just as much
an invention is . . .214
Notwithstanding the negative impact of Cameron v Hogan,215 it was stated
by the majority (Rich, Evatt, and McTiernan JJ) that an officer may be an
agent, and members of an unincorporated association are joint principals.
Furthermore, the English Court of Appeal decision of Kelly v National Society
of Operative Printers, cited by the majority in Cameron v Hogan,216 found
that an officer of an unincorporated association may be an agent.217 The
respective associations’ legislation also gives some additional support to the
concept that an officer is an agent of the association with actual authority.
While the respective legislation does not identify the type of agent the
common law would most likely view an officer to be a gratuitous agent when
dealing with third parties. The standard of care for a gratuitous agent will take
into account the agent’s actual degree of skill, judgment and experience that
they hold themselves out to have. Furthermore, the courts have shown little
tolerance to exempt a gratuitous agent from liability and, therefore, in the
circumstances, a gratuitous agent has been held to a minimal standard of care
opposed to that expected of a competent agent. This, however, is reflective of
torts law and not fiduciary principle as such.
214 [1965] Ch 992 at 1018–19; [1965] 1 All ER 849; [1965] 2 WLR 839.
215 (1934) 51 CLR 358; [1934] ALR 298; (1934) 8 ALJR 145; BC3400025.
216 Ibid, at CLR 373.
217 (1916) 113 LT 1055 at 1058, 1060, 1062.
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